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1.  Introduction 
 The decision of firms to hold substantial cash reserves has recently been a focus of 
attention in the corporate finance literature (see, e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 
2003; and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).  It is argued that the main benefit of holding cash in 
an imperfect capital market is the increase in firms’ ability to take up valuable 
investment opportunities when they arise and, at the same time, to avoid excessive cost 
of external financing.  However, it is also recognised that there are costs associated with 
holding cash. For example, managers and controlling shareholders are said to have 
incentives to retain cash to pursue their own private objectives that may not coincide 
with those of outside investors (Jensen, 1986). 
 Prior work on cash holdings identifies several firm-specific factors that are important 
for firms’ cash holding decisions.  There has been evidence that firm size, leverage, 
growth opportunities, and cash flow volatility play a significant role in determining how 
much cash firms choose to hold. Furthermore, it has been shown that corporate 
governance is important in explaining the corporate cash holding behaviour.  In a recent 
study, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) analyse the impact of ownership structure of UK firms 
on their cash holdings. They provide evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between 
managerial ownership and cash holdings. They observe that cash holdings first fall and 
then rise as managerial ownership increases. They also find that firms with ultimate 
controllers hold higher levels of cash than widely held firms. In a cross-country study, 
Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms that operate in countries where shareholder 
protection is poor tend to hold higher levels of cash.
1
 In contrast, Harford et al. (2004) 
show that for a sample of US firms, weaker shareholder rights are associated with lower 
cash holdings.  
  In this paper, we provide additional international empirical evidence on the 
determinants of firms’ cash holdings. More specifically, we consider both usual firm-
specific characteristics and country-specific legal and institutional information for a 
large sample of firms from Japan, France, Germany, the UK and the US.  However, our 
main contribution lies in the detailed analysis of the impact of leverage on cash 
holdings. As mentioned above, we are not the first to document the significant relation 
between the cash holdings and leverage of firms. Prior studies document a positive and 
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Pinkowitz et al. (2003) and Kalcheva and Lins (2003) also find that corporate governance has an impact 
on firms’ cash holdings using a cross country sample. Pinkowitz et al. show that cash holdings are 
inversely related to the quality of institutions and to the level of financial development of a country, but 
positively related to the country’s level of economic development.  Kalcheva and Lins (2003) find that 
firm-level managerial agency costs interact with external corporate governance in determining the level 
and value of   firms’ cash holdings. 
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monotonic relationship where it is shown that firms tend to increase their cash balances 
as their indebtedness increases. In this paper, we argue that there are reasons why this 
relationship may be non-monotonic. To the extent that leverage of firms acts as a proxy 
for their ability to issue debt one would expect a negative relation between leverage and 
cash holdings. For example, it is possible that firms can use borrowing as a substitute 
for holding cash. However, as leverage increases it is more likely that firms will 
experience financial distress and hence face the threat of bankruptcy. This, in turn, gives 
firms incentives to accumulate larger cash reserves to minimise the risk of financial 
distress and costly bankruptcy. Consequently, one would expect a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and leverage at high levels of leverage. Accordingly, in this 
paper, we hypothesise a non-linear relationship between leverage and cash holdings.  
 Furthermore, we argue that the nature of the non-linear relationship between cash 
holdings and leverage may be affected by country-specific corporate governance 
characteristics. In an attempt to capture the effect of these characteristics on the 
relationship between cash balances and leverage we interact leverage with several legal 
and institutional characteristics, including degree of creditor protection, shareholder 
protection, and ownership concentration. 
 Our findings are supportive of a significant non-linear relationship between cash 
balances of firms and leverage. Consistent with our hypothesis, leverage exerts a 
negative impact on cash holdings at low levels but the relationship becomes positive at 
high levels of leverage. We also observe that, in addition to firm-specific variables such 
as growth opportunities, size, capital expenditures, and dividend payouts, country-
specific ownership and legal characteristics play a significant role in determining cash 
holdings of firms. We find that stronger anti-director rights have a positive impact on 
cash holdings whereas ownership concentration has the opposite effect on cash 
holdings. We also find that the impact of leverage on cash partly depends on the 
country-specific characteristics. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings. Section 3 discusses the importance of 
institutional and legal characteristics in determining firms’ cash holdings. In section 4, 
we review the firm-specific characteristics that are expected to have a significant role in 
determining firms’ cash holding decisions. Section 5 discusses the empirical methods 
and describes the data.  Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 4 
2. Leverage and cash holdings 
 It is recognised that leverage plays a significant role in shaping firms’ cash policies. 
To the extent that the leverage of a firm acts as a proxy for the firm’s ability to issue 
debt one would expect a negative relation between leverage and cash holdings. That is, 
firms can use borrowing as a substitute for holding cash (John, 1993). Further, firms can 
maintain financial flexibility through having large cash reserves and/or unused debt 
capacity (low leverage) suggesting a negative relationship between firms’ cash reserves 
and leverage (see, e.g., Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
 However, the relationship between cash reserves and leverage can be non-monotonic 
implying that the marginal effect of increased leverage depends on its current level.   
At high levels of leverage firms are more likely to experience financial distress and, 
thus, accumulate larger cash reserves in order to minimise the risk of costly bankruptcy. 
It is also argued that financially constrained firms have more incentives to hold large 
cash balances (see, e.g., Hovakimian and Titman, 2003; and Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen, 1988). Then, to the extent that firms with high leverage are more likely to be 
constrained in raising external finance, they would increase their cash balances as a 
precautionary motive. These arguments suggest that the relationship between cash 
holdings and leverage can become positive at high levels of leverage. 
 To test the hypothesized non-monotonic nature of the relationship between cash 
holdings and leverage we estimate a quadratic model that implies one turning point. 
That is, as leverage increases, we expect to observe first a negative (substitution effect) 
then a positive  (precautionary effect) effect exerted by leverage on cash holdings.   
 
3.  Country-specific characteristics and cash holdings 
 This section contains a discussion of the role of country-specific factors, such as 
shareholder protection, creditor protection, and ownership structure in affecting cash 
holding incentives of firms. 
 
3.1. Legal environment and cash holdings 
 Conflicts of interests between corporate insiders, namely managers and controlling 
shareholders, and outside investors can create agency costs, which would in turn 
increase the cost of external financing.  One such example is the agency problem of free 
cash flow in excess of the amount required to fund all valuable investment projects 
(Jensen, 1986). That is, managers have incentives to increase the amount of funds under 
their control because this to some extent enables them to spend it as they wish, i.e. 
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squandering funds by consuming perquisites and/or making inefficient investment 
decisions. 
 What role does the legal environment play in reducing the costs of this type of 
agency problem?  It is argued that the severity of agency costs vary with the degree of 
protection the outside investors receive, which has implications for the ability of firms 
to raise external debt and equity finance (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998).  For example, in a 
country where the protection of outside investors is poor, expected agency costs will be 
higher and firms’ access to external finance funds will be limited.  In such an 
environment, firms are more likely to accumulate cash.  In this paper, we distinguish 
between shareholder and creditor protection.  As also discussed in previous studies, it is 
more likely that firms will hold less cash in countries with strong shareholder 
protection
2
. This is due to lower expected costs associated with the agency problem 
described above and hence the lower cost of external equity.   
 However, we argue that the impact of creditor protection on cash holdings can be 
different from that of shareholder protection. Strong creditor protection can increase the 
likelihood of bankruptcy when firms experience financial distress. We predict that this 
makes managers more conservative in relation to the levels of cash they hold.  As a 
result, they accumulate more cash in an attempt to reduce the threat by strong creditors 
of bankruptcy in financial distress. 
 In this paper, we investigate the impact of legal characteristics on incentives of firms 
to hold cash by considering two indicators developed by La Porta et al. (1997).  First, as 
a proxy for shareholder rights, we employ their measure of Anti-director rights index. 
This index aggregates such elements of shareholder rights as the ability to vote by mail, 
the possibility of cumulative voting for directors, the ease of calling an extra ordinary 
shareholder meeting, and the availability of legal mechanisms of protecting minority 
shareholders from expropriation by directors. Second, as a proxy for creditor rights, 
creditor rights index is used.  This aggregates the various rights that secured creditors 
might have in liquidation and reorganisation.  Restrictions on the managers’ ability to 
seek unilateral protection from creditors, mandatory dismissal of management in 
reorganisation, lack of automatic stay on assets, and absolute priority for secured 
creditors all contribute to the calculation of this index For details about the anti-director 
rights index and creditor rights index
3
.  
 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Dittmar et al. (2003) and Pinkowitz et al. (2003).  
3
 See La Porta et al. (1997). 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 Table 1 presents the values of these indicators for France, Germany, Japan, the UK 
and the US. It is clear that there is significant variation in these measures across the 
countries in our sample.  Creditor rights are strongest in the UK. The weakest scores 
belong to France and the US, 0 and 1, respectively. Out of 4 the scores of Japan and 
Germany are 2 and 3, respectively. As for the anti-director rights, the US has the highest 
score with 5 and Germany has the weakest one with a score of 1. The UK has also a 
high score of 4 out of 5.   France and Japan score 2 and 3 out of 5, respectively. We also 
calculate an alternative proxy for investor protection using the creditor and anti-director 
rights scores in the table. This is called creditor ratio and it is defined by the ratio of 
creditor rights to anti-director rights. We argue that it measures the relative importance 
of creditor rights to shareholder rights. We incorporate this variable in our analysis 
mainly because it is possible that creditor and anti-director rights measures are not 
independent of each other and hence it may be difficult to disentangle the effect of each 
measure on cash holdings.  
 
3.2. Ownership, control and cash holdings 
 A major institutional difference among the countries in our sample is due to 
ownership concentration.  As can be observed from Table 1, the ownership of firms in 
the US, the UK and Japan is largely dispersed, while it is highly concentrated in France 
and Germany.  Not surprisingly, the lowest ownership concentration is observed in the 
US and the UK with 12 percent and 13 percent, respectively. The concentration is 15 
percent for Japan while it is 24 percent and 50 percent for France and Germany, 
respectively.
4
  
 Ownership concentration might have important implications for potential agency 
problems. It is argued that one way to control the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders is to effectively monitor managers. However, an average shareholder 
might not have strong incentives to monitor managers, as the costs of monitoring are 
likely to outweigh the benefits (Grossman and Hart, 1988). In contrast, large 
shareholders, having claims on a large fraction of the firm’s cash flows, can monitor 
managers more effectively. Consequently, in the presence of a large shareholder, 
                                                          
4
 There is also evidence that there are substantial differences in the nature of ownership across the 
countries in our sample (see, for example, Claessens et al, 2000 for Japan and Faccio and Lang, 2002 for 
others). In the UK nearly 64 percent of non-financial firms and in Japan 79.8 percent of all firms are 
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managerial discretion is likely to be curbed and agency costs between management and 
shareholders are expected to be lower (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This, 
in turn, suggests that the cost of external financing would be lower for firms with large 
shareholders, implying less need to hold large cash balances.
5
 
 
4.  Firm-specific characteristics that influence cash holding decision 
 In this section, we provide a brief review of the firm-specific characteristics 
identified by theory as relevant in determining firms’ cash holding policies.  
 
4.1. Growth opportunities 
 It is predicted that there is a positive relation between cash reserves and growth 
opportunities of firms, based on the view that external financing is more costly for firms 
with greater growth opportunities.  There are at least two explanations as to why there is 
a wedge between the costs of internal and external finance. First, growth firms face 
higher agency costs because, when the investment opportunity set of firms consists of 
growth opportunities, firms with risky debt are more likely to pass up some of the 
valuable investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). Second, it is argued that asymmetric 
information is more severe between insiders and outside investors for firms whose 
values are largely determined by growth options (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Consequently, firms with greater growth opportunities accumulate more cash to avoid 
the necessity to resort to costly external financing and hence the possibility that they 
give up valuable investment opportunities. 
 It can also be argued that firms with greater growth opportunities are expected to 
incur higher bankruptcy costs (see, for example, Williamson, 1988; and Harris and 
Raviv, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).  Growth opportunities are intangible in nature 
and their value will fall significantly in financial distress and bankruptcy.  Larger 
expected costs would in turn imply that firms with greater growth opportunities have 
larger cash holdings to avoid financial distress and bankruptcy.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
widely held at the 20 percent threshold.  However, in France and Germany percentage of firms that are 
widely held is relatively much lower, respectively 12 and 10 percent. 
5
 One could, however, argue that large shareholders might have incentives to increase the amount of 
funds under their control to consume corporate benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. One way 
of doing it is obviously to accumulate large amounts of cash. With higher levels of cash holdings it is less 
likely that controlling shareholders will relinquish control and share the efficiency gains with outside 
shareholders. These arguments suggest a positive relationship between ownership concentration and cash 
balances. 
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 As a proxy for growth opportunities of firms we use the market-to-book ratio 
(MKTBOOK) defined as the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. 
 
4.2. Cash flow and cash flow variability 
 Kim et al. (1998) argue that cash flow provides a ready source of liquidity for 
investment and maturing liabilities.  Also, the risk of having to pass up investment 
opportunities and facing financial distress is lower for firms with higher cash flows. 
Accordingly, such firms can afford to have lower cash holdings. We measure cash flows 
(CFLOW) as the ratio of pretax profit plus depreciation to total assets.
6
 
 Firms with more volatile cash flows are expected to hold more cash in an attempt to 
mitigate the expected costs of liquidity constraints. As mentioned earlier, it may be 
costly to be short of cash and marketable securities if the firm has to pass up valuable 
investment opportunities. There is evidence that firms with cash shortfalls do indeed fail 
to take up some of the valuable growth opportunities. For example, Minton and Schrand 
(1999) show that firms with higher cash flow volatility permanently forgo investment 
rather than reacting to cash flow shortfalls by changing the discretionary investment 
timing. The measure we use for cash flow variability (VARIABILITY) is the standard 
deviation of cash flows divided by average total assets over the five year period from 
1996 to 2000.
7
 
 
4.3. Size 
 It is argued that larger firms are more likely to be diversified and thus less likely to 
experience financial distress (see, e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988); and smaller firms 
face more borrowing constraints and higher costs of external financing than larger firms 
(Whited, 1992; and Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). The above argument suggests a 
negative relationship between size and cash holdings of firms. Also, to the extent that 
size is an inverse proxy for the degree of informational asymmetry between insiders and 
outside investors, a negative relation should be expected between size and cash 
                                                          
6
 However, it is argued that in the presence of asymmetric information and signalling problems associated 
with external funding, firms have a preference for internal over external finance (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). This implies a positive influence of cash flow.  Also, to the extent that cash flows are a proxy for 
growth options the relationship between cash flow and cash holdings should be positive. 
7
 Although there are alternative definitions of cash flow variability used in different strands of the 
literature we use the one that has been adopted in the cash literature (see, e.g., Kim et al., 1998; Minton 
and Schrand, 1999; and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). However, our results remain unchanged with 
alternative definitions, e.g., the standard deviation of the first difference in cash flows scaled by average 
book value of the assets. 
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holdings. We use the natural logarithm of total sales in 1996 prices as a proxy for the 
size of firms (SIZE) 
 
4.4. Liquidity 
 We predict that there is a negative relation between the firm’s cash holdings and its 
liquid assets.  To the extent that firms can use other liquid assets besides cash when they 
have cash shortfalls, these assets can be seen as substitutes for cash holdings.  We use 
the ratio of net working capital, minus cash to total assets (LIQ) as a proxy for liquid 
asset substitutes. 
 
4.5. Other control variables 
 Similar to other studies, we also control for dividend policy and capital expenditures 
of firms (see, for example, Opler et al., 1999 and Dittmar et al., 2003).  For dividend 
policy we use a dividend dummy, DIVIDEND, which is equal to 1 if a firm pays 
dividend for a given year.  To control for the possibility that the firm’s cash holding 
policy is simply a function of its capital expenditures, we include the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets, CAPEX. Finally, industry dummies are included in all 
specifications. 
 
5.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
 
5.1. Cross-sectional estimation 
 We estimate a cross-sectional cash model using the average values of each of the 
independent variables (except variability and country-specific characteristics) over four 
years in an attempt to mitigate problems that might arise due to short-term fluctuations 
or extreme values in one year. We measure cash holdings (the dependent variable) in 
2000 and the explanatory variables over the period 1996-1999. This is done to control 
for the problem of endogeneity. Using past values reduces the likelihood of observed 
relations reflecting the effects of cash holdings on firm-specific factors.  
 
5.2. Data 
 For our empirical investigation we use a sample of listed firms from France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US over the period 1996-2000. There are mainly two 
reasons why we limit our analysis to these countries. First, there is evidence that these 
countries differ widely in terms of institutional and legal characteristics. Analysing cash 
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holdings for these countries may shed more light on the importance of these factors. 
Second, we were able to construct data for relatively longer periods and a large number 
of firms for each country. 
 Our initial sample is the set of all firms for which data are available on the 
Datastream database, which provides both accounting data for firms, and market value 
of equity. Firms, which operate in the financial sector, were excluded. Missing firm-
year observations for any variable in the model during the sample period were dropped. 
Finally, from these firms, only those with at least five continuous time series 
observations during the sample period were chosen. These criteria have provided us 
with a total number of 4,069 firms, which represents 20,353 firm-year observations.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis.  
The average cash-to-asset ratio, our dependent variable in the regression analysis, which 
is defined as the ratio of total cash and equivalent items to total assets, is highest for 
Japanese firms, 17 percent, and lowest for the US firms at 7 percent. Higher corporate 
cash holdings in Japan is explained by the incentives of banks to act at the expense of 
non-bank firms by encouraging them to hold relatively high levels of cash (Pinkowitz 
and Williamson, 2001). The lowest observed mean value for the US firms ( 7 percent) 
may be an indication of the reduced incentives of firms to accumulate cash when they 
have relatively easy access to external capital markets. For UK and France, average 
cash-to-asset ratio is 11 percent and 12 percent, respectively.  Finally, the German 
companies hold on average about 8.7 percent of their total assets in cash and marketable 
securities.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
 Table 3 reports univariate comparisons of the firm-specific characteristics by cash-
to-assets quartile
8
. We carry out this analysis by constructing quartiles of cash holdings 
ratio and investigate whether the firm-specific characteristics of high-cash companies 
(those firms in the fourth quartile) differ significantly from those of low-cash companies 
(those firms in the first quartile). There is strong evidence that high-cash firms display 
significantly different characteristics from low-cash firms and differences are significant 
                                                          
8
 A similar comparison is also made in Opler et al. (1999). 
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at the 1 percent level except for the market-to-book ratio for which the significance 
level is 5 percent. Our results reveal that firms with larger cash balances seem to have 
greater growth opportunities, though the relationship is not monotonic.  In contrast to 
the expected negative relation between cash holdings and firm size, the univariate 
relation shows that firms with the most cash have larger size than those with the least 
cash.  Cash flow variability decreases monotonically with the cash ratio, which is not in 
line with the predicted positive relation between cash holdings and cash flow variability. 
As expected, the relation between cash flow and cash holdings is negative. Cash flows 
decrease monotonically with cash holdings, which is consistent with the view that cash 
flow provides a ready source of liquidity for investment expenditures. Furthermore, 
capital expenditures decrease monotonically across quartiles of cash holdings. 
 Finally, as for leverage, the difference between the leverage ratio of firms in the first 
quartile and that of firms in the fourth quartile is significant. High-cash firms have much 
lower average leverage ratio than low-cash firms. However, despite the dramatic fall in 
the fourth quartile, the average leverage ratio seems stable over the first three quartiles. 
 Table 3 (Panel B) also presents a basic test of the difference in means for the 
dependent variable, the cash-to-assets ratio. We carry out this test across countries using 
the average cash values over the sample period for each country. That is, the average 
value of cash holdings for firms in each country is compared with that in all other 
countries in our sample. This analysis provides strong evidence that the average value 
of cash holdings of firms differ significantly across countries.  
 
6.  Results 
 
6.1. Country specific effects 
 Table 4 presents the first set of cross-sectional results. In the first column, we present 
OLS results for the pooled regression analysis where, in addition to firm-specific 
characteristics and industry dummies, country dummies are incorporated to test the null 
hypothesis that cash holdings of firms do not significantly change across countries.  The 
UK is taken as the base country in the analysis. 
 The preliminary findings reveal that except for Germany there is a significant 
country specific component to firms’ cash holdings. The estimated coefficients of the 
dummy variables for Japan and France are positive and significant at 1 percent level, 
suggesting that Japanese and French firms hold more cash than British and German 
firms. This is consistent with the average values of cash holdings across countries in 
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Table 1. For example, the regression analysis suggests that the average difference in 
cash holdings of firms between France and the UK is about 4 percent controlling the 
firm-specific characteristics.  Overall, our results suggest that country-specific factors 
play a significant role in determining firms’ cash holding decisions. 
 The pooled regression results also indicate that firms’ cash holdings increase with 
volatility of cash flows, market-to-book ratio and liquidity position of firms, and 
decrease with dividend payouts of firms. Furthermore, as expected, the results suggest 
that firms with greater capital expenditures tend to have lower amounts of cash. There 
is, however, no evidence to support the view that an increase in firm size decreases 
firms’ incentives to accumulate more cash.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
 Last but not least, the results show that the leverage decision of firms impacts their 
cash balances significantly and in a non-linear fashion. More specifically, we first 
observe a negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings. However, the 
relationship between the two variables turns out to be positive at higher levels of 
leverage. These findings support the view that borrowing can initially be seen as a 
substitute for holding cash. However, it seems that the probability of financial distress, 
which is a function of leverage, leads firms to accumulate larger cash reserves at greater 
levels of leverage in an attempt to minimise the risk of costly bankruptcy. These results 
provide the preliminary evidence of the hypothesised non-linear leverage effect on cash 
holdings.
 
 In columns 2 to 6, we provide the cash regression results with respect to each country 
separately. The results with regard to the majority of variables are similar to those in the 
pooled regression analysis. More specifically, the relationship between cash holdings 
and leverage is first negative and significant at the 1 percent level for all countries. 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of the quadratic leverage term is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level across all countries. These findings provide further 
support for the non-linear relation between cash holdings and leverage. We also 
estimated the turning points – points at which the sign of the relationship between cash 
holdings and leverage changes from negative to positive - for each country. We find a 
range of values of leverage from about 39 percent (for UK) to about 59 percent (for 
Japan). The values for France, the US and Germany are about 48 percent, 49 percent 
and 54 percent, respectively. 
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 As for the impact of other financial variables, liquidity has a negative and significant 
impact on firms’ cash holdings for all except the US firms. The estimated relation 
between cash holdings and leverage for the US firms is positive and significant. 
Consistent with the prediction, the effect of growth opportunities on cash holdings is 
positive and significant except in Germany. In line with the hypothesis of financing 
hierarchy model specifying internal finance as the least costly financing form, cash 
holdings are negatively related to capital expenditures.  However, this relation is 
positive but insignificant for the US.  As for firm size, the estimated coefficient of size 
is positive and significant only for the Japanese companies, suggesting that larger firms 
in Japan tend to hold larger amounts of cash. However, more in line with the theoretical 
predictions, we find for France, Germany and the UK a negative impact exerted by 
firms’ size on their cash holdings. Similarly, we have mixed findings regarding the 
dividend variable. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant for the firms in 
the US and the impact of dividend on cash holdings is positive and significant in 
Germany. Dividend payouts of firms do not seem to have any significant impact on 
their cash holdings in France, Japan and the UK. 
 Finally, we do not find a statistically significant relation between cash holdings and 
cash flow variability in all countries except the US where the relation between cash 
holdings and the variability of cash flows is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level. This partial evidence for the US supports the view that firms with more volatile 
cash flows are expected to hold more cash in an attempt to mitigate the expected costs 
of liquidity constraints.  
 
6.2. Country specific effects and the impact of leverage 
 In Table 5, we continue to carry out our cross-sectional investigation. In order to 
incorporate legal and institutional characteristics into the analysis, we focus on pooled-
regression analysis. In the first three columns, in addition to firm-specific factors and 
industry dummies, we incorporate the proxies for investor protection, namely creditor 
righs (Creditor) and shareholders’ rights (Anti-director), and the ownership 
concentration variable, Ownership. We also investigate whether the nature of the 
relationship between cash holdings and leverage changes with legal protection of 
investors and ownership concentration. To this end, in each model we interact the 
leverage terms with the proxies for investor protection and ownership concentration. 
Moreover, in Table 5, Panel B, we report the turning points computed for each 
specification using the values of country-specific characteristics. 
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 Overall, the results suggest that legal and institutional characteristics play an 
important role in determining cash holdings of firms. However, we provide somewhat 
mixed results regarding some of the characteristics. More specifically, there is no 
support for the view that firms in countries with better creditor protection are expected 
to hold larger cash balances. This result does not provide support for the argument that 
the likelihood of bankruptcy for financially distressed firms is higher in countries with 
higher creditor protection and firms in such countries hold higher cash reserves that may 
help firms in financial distress avoid bankruptcy. However, the estimated coefficients of 
interactions suggest that creditor protection may have some impact on the nature of the 
relationship between cash holdings and leverage. In particular, we find that the 
substitution effect of leverage on cash holdings gets smaller as the creditor protection 
increases. This is given by the positive estimated coefficient of the first interaction term, 
i.e. (Leverage*Creditor).  Additionally, column (2) of Table 5 (Panel B) demonstrates 
the turning points computed for each value of creditor protection. As shown in this 
table, the substitution effect of leverage on cash holdings reduces as the creditor 
protection increases.  We observe that the leverage ratio at which the nature of the 
relation between cash holdings and leverage changes (i.e. it turns from negative to 
positive) decreases as the creditor protection rises. For example, the computed turning 
point drops to 46 percent from 55 percent as the creditor protection increases from 0 to 
the highest value of 4. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
 The results in the second column of Table 5 (Panel A) reveal that anti-directors rights 
exert a positive influence on firms’ cash holdings. That is, firms in countries with 
stronger anti-director rights hold larger cash balances. This finding is not in line with 
the view that expected agency costs are lower in countries with better investment 
protection and hence firms in these countries do not need to accumulate large cash 
balances to finance their future investment opportunities. This is expected to happen 
simply because the cost of external finance would be lower as agency costs decline.  
However, our findings with regard to the interaction variables provide interesting 
insights into the relation between cash and leverage and the conditional impact of 
leverage on cash holdings. Our results reveal that as anti-director rights index increases 
the negative impact of debt on cash holdings become more apparent, suggesting a 
stronger substitution effect of borrowing for cash holdings. Similarly, we find that the 
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positive impact of leverage on cash becomes stronger as the shareholders’ rights 
increases. Additionally, Table 5 (Panel B) reveals that the computed turning points 
decrease as the value of anti-directors index increases. Whereas the turning point for the 
lowest anti-directors value is 57 percent it decreases to 50 percent for the highest value 
of anti-directors rights. 
 It is possible that creditor and anti-director rights are correlated
9
. Thus, we have so 
far avoided including them in the same specification. However, we incorporate in our 
analysis an alternative proxy for the protection of firms’ creditors, Creditor Ratio, 
defined as the ratio of creditor rights to anti-director rights, which measures the relative 
importance of creditor rights with respect to the shareholders’ rights. Our results show 
that this ratio has a negative impact on firms’ cash holdings and the interaction terms 
reveal that the substitution (negative) effect of leverage on cash holdings reduces as the 
creditor ratio increases. That is, firms in countries with relatively better creditor 
protection are less likely to hold large cash balances. Furthermore, the positive impact 
of leverage observed at higher levels of leverage seems to be also decreasing as the 
value of this ratio increases. Finally, we observe that in Table 5 (Panel B) the turning 
points computed for each value of creditor ratio changes between 0.52 and 0.48. 
 Next, in the column 4 of Table 5 (Panel A) we replace creditor ratio with ownership 
concentration, measured as the median ownership by the three largest shareholders for 
the 10 largest firms. We do so because ownership concentration may act as a substitute 
to other legal characteristics
10
. The results reveal that higher ownership concentration 
leads to lower cash holdings. To the extent that large shareholders have more incentives 
and better ability to monitor and discipline the firm’s management this result may 
indicate that the expected managerial agency costs are lower for firms with greater 
ownership concentration, which in turn reduces the need for firms to accumulate large 
amount of cash. Furthermore, we observe that the negative substitution effect of 
leverage reduces as the ownership concentration increases. This is given by the positive 
estimated coefficient of the first interaction term, i.e. (Leverage*Ownership). However, 
the estimated coefficient of the second interaction term is insignificant. 
 The above results suggest that leverage has a strong and robust non-linear effect on 
firms’ cash holdings. Moreover, the nature of the relation between cash reserves and 
                                                          
9
 La Porta et al.(1997) argue that legal origin can influence both shareholder and creditor rights; e.g., 
common law countries give both shareholders and creditors relatively stronger protection, while civil law 
countries give them weaker protection. 
10
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that higher ownership concentration may be a reflection of poor 
investor protection.   
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leverage seems to change from one country to another depending upon country-specific 
characteristics. Both the substitution and precautionary effects tend to weaken in the 
presence of strong creditor rights and ownership concentration. However, better 
shareholder rights do not lead to the same conclusion. More specifically, both the 
negative impact (substitution) and the positive effect (precautionary) of leverage on 
cash holdings become stronger with greater anti-director rights. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
 In this paper we have investigated firms’ cash holding decisions by using firm-level 
data from Japan, France, Germany, UK and US. There are mainly two important 
features of our analysis, which, we believe, extend our understanding of the cash 
holding behaviour of firms. First, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the 
relationship between cash holdings and leverage. More specifically, we establish that 
borrowing decisions of firms exert a non-linear impact on their cash holding decisions. 
We argue that this stems from the fact that leverage acts as a substitute for cash holdings 
but at the same time increases the probability of financial distress. One hence observes 
first a negative relationship at lower levels of leverage and the observed relation 
becomes positive at high leverage levels.  
 Secondly, we focus on the importance of corporate governance issues.  In doing so, 
we incorporate legal and institutional characteristics such as ownership concentration, 
degree of creditor and shareholder protection into our analysis. We argue that strong 
creditor protection increase the probability of bankruptcy in financial distress, which 
would in turn imply more accumulation of cash as a precaution to avoid financial 
distress. Last but not least, we interact leverage with these legal and institutional 
characteristics to test if the nature of the relationship between cash and leverage changes 
across countries depending on those country-specific characteristics. 
 We find that institutional and legal characteristics as well as firm-specific 
characteristics play a significant role in determining cash holdings of firms. Our results 
provide evidence that the degree of investor protection can influence cash policies of 
firms. More specifically, we find that strong investor protection and high ownership 
concentration seem to lead firms to hold lower cash balances. Furthermore, the impact 
of leverage on cash changes with legal and institutional characteristics. 
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Table 1 
Institutional and legal characteristics 
 
  
Ownership  
Concentration 
 
Creditor rights 
 
Anti-director 
rights 
 
Creditor ratio 
 
France  
 
0.24 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
Germany 0.50 3 1 3 
Japan 0.13 2 3 0.67 
UK 0.15 4 4 1 
US 0.12 1 5 0.20 
For each country ownership concentration denotes the median ownership by the three largest 
shareholders for the 10 largest non-financial firms. Creditor rights denotes an index aggregating 
creditor rights; the index ranges from 0 to 4. Anti-director rights is an index aggregating shareholder 
rights and ranging from 0 to 5. Creditor ratio is the ratio of creditor rights to anti-director rights. 
Source: La Porta et al.  (1997, 1998). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
 
 Mean Std. Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
France        
Cash 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.59 
Cash Flow 0.08 0.08 -0.86 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.39 
Leverage 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.31 0.90 
Liquidity 0.01 0.14 -0.31 -0.09 0.01 0.11 0.49 
Mkt-to-Book 1.65 1.04 0.66 1.06 1.32 1.93 9.51 
Size 15.01 1.81 10.38 13.73 14.81 16.30 19.08 
Capex 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.51 
Variability 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.62 
Germany        
Cash 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.82 
Cash Flow 0.07 0.08 -0.60 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.25 
Leverage 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.34 0.79 
Liquidity 0.11 0.25 -1.39 -0.03 0.11 0.25 0.99 
Mkt-to-Book 1.52 0.96 0.41 1.07 1.26 1.64 12.68 
Size 12.39 2.86 0.00 11.27 12.69 13.94 18.47 
Capex 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.27 
Variability 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.42 
Japan        
Cash 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.76 
Cash Flow 0.03 0.04 -0.19 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.18 
Leverage 0.304 0.20 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.44 0.91 
Liquidity -0.04 0.15 -1.06 -0.13 -0.03 0.06 0.48 
Mkt-to-Book 1.15 0.55 0.510 0.92 1.04 1.19 10.53 
Size 18.46 1.44 14.39 17.52 18.28 19.28 23.55 
Capex 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.57 
Variability 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.42 
UK        
Cash 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.14 1.00 
Cash Flow 0.08 0.11 -0.76 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.34 
Leverage 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.80 
Liquidity 0.03 0.18 -0.74 -0.08 0.01 0.14 0.81 
Mkt-to-Book 1.90 1.38 0.24 1.07 1.44 2.18 10.09 
Size 9.27 2.06 3.18 7.91 9.14 10.62 15.63 
Capex 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.43 
Variability 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.40 
US        
Cash 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.85 
Cash Flow 0.16 0.08 -0.14 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.89 
Leverage 0.28 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.27 0.38 0.99 
Liquidity 1.92 1.26 0.14 1.14 1.66 2.30 16.60 
Mkt-to-Book 1.95 1.72 0.39 1.21 1.54 2.16 40.02 
Size 13.51 1.53 6.17 12.46 13.44 14.48 18.54 
Capex 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.73 
Variability 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.38 
Cash is the ratio of total cash and equivalent items to total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation 
to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of current assets minus total cash and 
equivalent to total assets. Mkt-to-Book is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity to book value of assets. Size is the log of total sales in 1996 prices.  Capex is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets. Variability is the ratio of the standard deviation of cash flows to average total assets. 
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 Table 3 
              Panel A: Univariate analysis of the variables (all countries pooled) 
 
 First 
Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Fourth 
Quartile 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Cash range 0.00 to 
0.02 
0.02 to 
0.08 
0.08 to 
0.17 
0.17 to 
1.00 
 
      
Cash 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.29 -69.46 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.12) (0.25) (0.00) 
Cash Flow 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.06 14.63 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) 
Leverage 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.18 12.97 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.14) (0.00) 
Liquidity 0.90 0.55 0.23 0.40 9.61 
 (0.65) (0.09) (-0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Mkt-to-Book 1.58 1.62 1.46 1.73 -2.86 
 (1.34) (1.26) (1.12) (1.19) (0.00) 
Size 12.28 13.94 15.68 15.32 -19.08 
 (12.67) (13.70) (17.16) (17.09) (0.00) 
Capex 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 5.65 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) 
Variability 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 4.45 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) 
  See notes to Table 2. T-statistic is for the mean differences of each variable between 
   the fourth and first quartiles. Median values are in parentheses. 
 
                          Table 3 
                          Panel B: Mean differences of Cash between countries 
 
 France  Germany Japan UK 
Germany 3.77
 
   
 (0.00)    
Japan -6.08
 
-12.32   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
UK 1.66 -2.71 9.15  
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.00)  
US 6.65 2.51 15.99 6.51 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
                                 The hypothesised mean difference is zero. T-statistics values are  
                                 shown above p-values. 
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Table 4 
Cash holdings and firm-specific factors with country dummies 
 
 Pooled France Germany Japan UK US 
Constant 0.17
*** 
0.24
*** 
0.22
*** 
0.18
*** 
0.24
*** 
0.07
** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Cash Flow -0.19
*** 
0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.2055
***
 -0.2274
***
 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) 
Leverage -0.48
***
 -0.49
***
 -0.33
***
 -0.63
***
 -0.53
***
 -0.41
***
 
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
Leverage
2
 0.46
***
 0.51
**
 0.30
*
 0.53
***
 0.69
***
 0.43
***
 
 (0.04) (0.21) (0.17) (0.06) (0.19) (0.06) 
Liquidity 0.02
***
 -0.14
***
 -0.05
**
 -0.07
***
 -0.13
***
 0.03
***
 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
Capex -0.07
**
 -0.20
*
 -0.28
**
 -0.10
**
 -0.21
**
 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
Mkt-to-Book 0.01
***
 0.02
***
 -0.00 0.02
***
 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size -0.00 -0.01
* 
-0.01
*
 0.00
*
 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dividend -0.01
**
 0.01 0.03
*
 -0.00 -0.0220 -0.0195
***
 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Variability 0.13
***
 -0.18 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.29
***
 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) 
France 0.04
***
      
 (0.01)      
Germany -0.01      
 (0.01)      
Japan 0.10
***
      
 (0.01)      
US -0.03
***
      
 (0.01)      
       
Observations 4,069 234 390 1,436 912 1,097 
F-statistic 58.42
*** 3.11
*** 
2.99
*** 
28.07
*** 
9.05
*** 
23.08
*** 
Adjusted R
2 
0.27 0.17 0.10 0.29 0.16 0.30 
Cash, the dependent variable, is the ratio of total cash and equivalent items to total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of 
pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio 
of current assets minus total cash and equivalent to total assets. Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets.  Mkt-to-Book is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity to book value of assets. Size is the log of total sales in 1996 prices. Dividend is equal to 1 if a firm pays 
dividend for a given year. Variability is the ratio of the standard deviation of cash flows to average total assets. 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. France, Germany, Japan and the US are 
country dummies where the UK is used as the base country. Industry dummies are included in all models. 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 indicate coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   
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              Table 5 
Panel A: The impact of leverage and country-specific institutional and 
legal factors on cash holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.09
*** 
0.07
*** 
0.13
*** 
0.15
*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.33
***
 -0.35
***
 -0.35
***
 -0.34
***
 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Leverage -0.67
***
 -0.30
***
 -0.68
***
 -0.69
***
 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) 
Leverage
2
 0.61
***
 0.24
*
 0.66
***
 0.63
***
 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.08) 
Liquidity 0.01
**
 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Capex -0.08
**
 -0.07
**
 -0.06
**
 -0.06
**
 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Mkt-to-Book 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dividend -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
*
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Variability 0.07
*
 0.08
*
 0.07
*
 0.08
*
 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Creditor -0.00    
 (0.00)    
Anti-director  0.01
***
   
  (0.00)   
Ownership    -0.20
***
 
    (0.03) 
Creditor ratio   -0.03
***
  
   (0.01)  
Leverage* Creditor 0.04
*
    
 (0.03)    
Leverage
2
*Creditor -0.02    
 (0.04)    
Leverage*Anti-director  -0.08
***
   
  (0.02)   
Leverage
2
*Anti-director  0.08
***
   
  (0.03)   
Leverage*Ownership    0.53
**
 
    (0.25) 
Leverage
2
*Ownership    -0.28 
    (0.41) 
Leverage*Creditor Ratio   0.11
***
  
   (0.03)  
Leverage
2 
*Creditor Ratio   -0.09
*
  
   (0.06)  
     
Observations 4,069 4,069 4,069 4,069 
F-statistic 48.41
*** 
47.96
*** 
48.96
*** 
49.97
*** 
Adjusted R
2 
0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 
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Table 5  
Panel B: Country-specific characteristics and turning points 
 
Creditor 
rights 
Turning 
Points 
Anti- 
director 
rights 
Turning 
points 
Creditor 
ratio 
Turning 
points 
Ownership 
concentration 
Turning 
points 
        
0 0.55 1 0.57 0 0.52 0.12 0.52 
1 0.53 2 0.54 0.20 0.52 0.13 0.52 
2 0.51 3 0.52 0.67 0.51 0.15 0.52 
3 0.48 4 0.51 1 0.51 0.24 0.50 
4 0.46 5 0.50 3 0.48 0.50 0.43 
See notes to Tables 1 to 3, and also La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) for the values of country-specific 
factors. 
 
 
 
